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ABSTRACT
Financial Crises, Monetary Policy and Financial Fragility;
A Second-Generation Model of Currency Crises*
In this Paper we present a model that combines the second-generation trade-
off between costs of maintenance and abandonment with possible balance-
sheet problems in the corporate sector. We show how debt levels can move a
small economy from a fixed exchange rate to a floating exchange rate
equilibrium or vice versa, simply by altering the trade-off faced by the
monetary authorities. Even if the monetary authorities still have a substantial
amount of foreign reserves available to guarantee the fixed value of the
currency, they might choose not to and abandon the fixed exchange rate
regime. Although it is often argued that first- and second-generation literature
have not been able to explain the crisis in East Asia (1997-98), our model
suggests that adding corporate balance sheet positions to second-generation
models could substantially improve the explanatory power of these models in
the case of the Asian crisis.
JEL Classification: E44 and E52
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The history of currency crises goes back a long time. It was already in 1863, that
the author Joseph Holbrey, in response to a crisis in England in 1857, expressed
his desire to identify their cause and ﬁnd the most likely remedy. From his
conclusions it follows that currency crises were no less harmful in those periods
than they are today: “The present system, every now and then, brings a crisis
which carries ruin and desolation to many who are innocent, as well as to those
who are more or less guilty; while it is the cause of wide-spread misery to
both, it is not, even to the guilty, in proportion to their guilt.”1 In the last
three decades, many countries and regions around the world have suﬀered from
minor or major currency crises. Mexico (‘73-’82) and Argentina (’78-’81)w e r e
early examples. In the nineties, several countries in Europe (‘92-’93), again
Mexico (‘94-’95), East Asia (‘97-’98), Russia (’98), and Brazil (’99) followed.
More recently, Turkey (’00-’01) and Argentina (’01-’02) were hit by this painful
event.
Although these crises have already been subject to many debates among
both policymakers and academics, their origin remains the source of much
controversy. From an academic perspective, an extensive economic literature
has evolved, both theoretical and empirical. The traditional theoretical litera-
ture consists of two major views, represented in respectively ﬁrst-, and second-
generation models of currency crises. First-generation literature was developed
in response to crises in developing countries such as Mexico (1973-1982) and Ar-
gentina (1978-1981). Both crises were preceded by periods of overly expansive
domestic policies combined with more or less ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. First-
generation models derive from work done by Salant and Henderson (1978), who
discussed the consequences of price stabilization schemes in commodity markets.
Such price stabilization, through the buying and selling of commodity reserves,
will sooner or later lead to severe speculative attacks and depletion of reserves,
according to the authors. It was not long before others2 realised that the concept
of exhaustible resources could also be applied to a central bank attempting to
ﬁx the exchange rate by selling and buying foreign currency. In both cases, the
government attempts to stabilise the price of an exhaustible resource by using
reserves. The ﬁrst-generation models explain currency crises as the result of the
inconsistency between internal and external government policies. More in par-
ticular, the combination of structural government deﬁcits and a ﬁxed exchange
rate leads to depletion of foreign reserves, eventually resulting in crisis.
The crucial feature of second-generation literature3, which was developed
in response to crises in Europe (1992-1993) and, again, Mexico (1994-1995), is
the recognition that the maintenance or collapse of a ﬁxed exchange rate is a
matter of trade-oﬀ rather than a simple process of foreign reserve depletion.
Not only does the question of whether to maintain a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
1Holbrey (1863), p. 366
2First-generation models are probably best represented by Krugman (1979) and Flood and
Garber (1984).
3For a leading example of second-generation models please refer to Obstfeld (1994).
2involve costs and beneﬁts, second-generation models assume that the costs of
maintenance increase when people expect a collapse. As a consequence, the
policy of the government is no longer exogenous but depends, among other
things, on the market’s beliefs about the future. Under speciﬁc circumstances,
this can lead to multiple equilibria and self-fulﬁlling expectations in the course
of which the very existence of these expectations determines the equilibrium
that prevails.
Although ﬁrst- and second-generation models have considerable relevance to
crises in the past, it is often argued4 that they have not been able to explain
the crises in the countries of East Asia (’97-’98). The governments of these
countries did not experience any ﬁrst-generation alike ﬁscal problems at that
time nor did any of them face the clear trade-oﬀ between exchange rate stability
and unemployment that featured several countries in the EMS in ’92 and ’93.
As a result, it seemed that, to explain the Asian crisis, a ’third-generation’
model was needed. Most of the attempts to produce such a model focused
on the ﬁnancial sector as being the cause of the crisis. Krugman (1998) and
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998a, 1998b) for example, argued that implicit
government guarantees led to an excessive level of investment which after some
time collapsed when governments were no longer willing or able to cover the
losses. Alternatively, Chang and Velasco (1998a, 1998b) concentrated, analogue
to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), on a shortage of liquidity in the banking system
caused by a loss of conﬁdence among investors. More recently, several authors
have emphasised the role of ﬁrms’ balance sheets in the origin of crises.5
In this paper we present a model that combines the second-generation trade-
oﬀ between costs of maintenance and abandonment with possible balance-sheet
problems in the corporate sector. More speciﬁcally, we show how the levels
of (consolidated) domestic currency denominated and foreign currency denom-
inated short-term debt inﬂuence the trade-oﬀ that the central bank faces when
deciding whether to defend a currency peg. Depending on these debt levels,
the probability of an exchange rate collapse may alter. Even if the monetary
authorities still have a substantial amount of foreign reserves available to guar-
antee the ﬁxed value of the currency, they might choose not to and abandon the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
Especially in the light of the crisis in Asia, the appropriate reaction of mone-
tary authorities to speculative attacks has been the source of much controversy.
According to the so-called ’traditional view’, tighter monetary policy was needed
to defend the ﬁxed value of the currency and restore market conﬁdence. This
was also the policy that the IMF initially prescribed. On the other hand, a
’revisionist view’ emerged, which argued that when speculative attacks are ac-
companied by substantial balance-sheet problems in the ﬁnancial and corporate
sectors, raising interest rates may actually have a reverse eﬀect on the level of
the exchange rate. In this respect, the high debt/equity ratios in the corporate
sector of several Asian crisis countries at the time of the crisis are remarkable.
4Refer to for example Krugman (1999)
5For example, Krugman (1999)
3Especially when compared to the pre-crisis period in Mexico in 1994, when
this country was facing interest rates as high as 75 % (annually) without col-
lapsing, the Asian economies were more vulnerable because their corporations
were much more highly leveraged. A number of recent empirical studies have
attempted to ﬁnd evidence on the eﬀect of tightening monetary policy on the
level of the exchange rate. Neither the ’traditional view’ nor the ’revisionist
view’ are supported by conclusive evidence, although this may partly be the
result of methodological problems.6
2 The model
We use an extended version of the Dornbusch7 sticky-price monetary model for
the exchange rate to study a small open emerging-market economy8.T h eD o r n -
busch model has a number of widely celebrated features. First, it is a simple
and elegant model. Second, given a permanent shock to the economy, it dis-
tinguishes between a ’short run’ horizon, during which only ﬁnancial variables
(interest rate and exchange rate) adjust, and a ’long run’ horizon, during which
the price level begins to adjust. Third, the model assumes that market partici-
pants have perfect foresight when it comes to this adjustment process. Finally,
the Dornbusch model contains the famous ’overshooting’ result where a mone-
tary expansion causes the exchange rate to overshoot its long-run equilibrium
level9 in the short run before appreciating back towards it in the long run.
For simplicity, our model is limited to two subsequent periods: period t and
period t+1. We assume that prices are sticky in period t (’short run’) and
fully adjust in period t+1 (’long run’) in order to maintain equilibrium in the
money and goods markets. Initially, the monetary authorities maintain a ﬁxed
exchange rate. This implies that, unlike in the Dornbusch model, monetary
policy cannot be set autonomously but has to guarantee the currency peg at all
t i m e s .I nt h ec a s ew h e r et h eﬁxed exchange rate is abandoned, monetary policy
is no longer restricted and can be set freely. However, in period t+1, the price
level will adjust in proportion to period t and expected period t+1 changes in the
money supply. Market participants are assumed to form rational expectations.
They dispose of the same information as the monetary authorities. Our model
assumes that, given that domestic and foreign debt ratios10 remain at their
natural levels11, market participants and the monetary authorities have perfect
6Refer to for example Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Kraay (2000), Goldfajn and Baig (1998),
Goldfajn and Gupta (1999), and Gould and Kamin (2000).
7Dornbusch (1976)
8The small open character of the economy in our model follows from the assumption that
the ’foreign interest rate’ is assumed exogenous. This ’large’ foreign economy in our model
represents either the ’rest of the world’ or the main trading partner of the home country.
9The long-run equilibrium level is determined by purchasing power parity.
10domestic debt denotes domestic currency denominated short-term debt, assumed to be
subject to the variable domestic short-term interest rate controlled by the monetary authori-
ties; foreign debt denotes foreign currency denominated debt (for reasons of simplicity we do
not distinguish between short-term and long-term foreign debt)
11The ’natural’ level of the domestic and foreign debt ratios is assumed exogenous and equal
4foresight on the path of the economy. However, possible deviations of the debt
levels in period t cannot be foreseen in advance. Therefore, when setting the
price level for period t, market participants base themselves on the expectation
that debt will still be at its natural level.12 When setting monetary policy in
period t, the monetary authorities take account of possible deviations of the
debt levels and will adjust monetary policy accordingly.
In this section we will present the basic model and, subsequently, the dy-
namics of the model. Symbols that are marked by asterisks pertain to foreign
variables and are assumed exogenous.
Mt − ¯ pt = γ − β (it − RPt) (1)
yt = yn − λ (rt − rn)+θ (St − pt) (2)
rn = r∗ = c (3)
it = i∗ +( St+1 − St)+RPt (4)
St+1 = pt+1 (5)
it = rt + ˙ pt+1 (6)
where γ, β, λ, θ,and c are strictly positive constants.
Notation
All variables in logarithms; in the remainder of the paper, we will use a
circumﬂex to denote the non-logarithmic form of the variables (e.g. ˆ Mt), unless
mentioned otherwise.
Mt domestic nominal money supply in period t
¯ pt domestic price level in period t (ﬁxed)
it (1+it), where it denotes the domestic nominal interest rate in
period t
RPt (1+RPt), where RPt denotes the default risk premium on
domestic debt relative to foreign debt in period t
yt domestic real output in period t
yn natural level of domestic real output
rt (1+rt), where rt denotes the domestic real interest rate
in period t
rn (1+rn)w h e r er n denotes the natural domestic real interest rate
to the ratio’s in the ’foreign country’. Later on it will be explained that the risk premium on
domestic debt titles is in our model a relative risk premium as it denotes only the diﬀerence
between the risk premium on foreign and domestic debt titles.
12One could argue here that deviations of debt levels have never occurred before or are
mean-zero distributed.
5r∗ (1+r*), where r* denotes the foreign real interest rate (ﬁxed)
St exchange rate in period t (initially ﬁxed), deﬁned as the price of
foreign currency in terms of home currency
i∗ (1+i*), where i* denotes the foreign nominal interest rate (ﬁxed)
St+1 exchange rate in period t+1 corresponding to the
maturity of the interest rate
˙ pt+1 level of inﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt + 1 (= pt+1 − ¯ pt)
Equation (1) represents equilibrium in the domestic money market. The
demand for real money balances is assumed to depend on the domestic interest
rate less the risk premium and will, in equilibrium, equal the real money sup-
ply. Since we assume risk neutrality, market participants are only interested in
the expected return on domestic assets13. Equation (2) denotes goods market
equilibrium. Our model assumes demand determined output in the short run.
Deviations of the real interest rate from its natural level and the exchange rate
from its purchasing power parity (PPP) level14 may cause a deviation of output
from its natural level. The former reﬂects the discouraging eﬀect of higher inter-
est rates on investment as part of aggregate demand. The latter indicates that
aggregate demand is rising with the level of the real exchange rate, St −pt.T h i s
is under the assumption that a real depreciation of the domestic currency shifts
world demand towards home-produced goods. Equation (3) states that the nat-
ural real interest rate equals the (ﬁxed) foreign real interest rate. We assume
that the debt levels and the price level in the foreign country are permanently
ﬁxed. Furthermore, we assume that the foreign real interest rate, which equals
the foreign nominal interest rate, is strictly positive. This can reﬂect either a
capital market equilibrium with a strictly positive marginal product of capital or
a strictly positive risk premium corresponding with the ﬁxed debt levels in the
foreign country.15 Equation (4) shows a revised version of the uncovered interest
rate parity condition. Since we study a small open emerging market economy,
we assume, unlike Dornbusch, imperfect substitutability of domestic and foreign
debt titles. This assumption reﬂects the real world observation that emerging
markets often face a higher risk premium (‘spread’) on their foreign loans than
industrialised countries16. As in Dornbusch, our model assumes perfect capital
mobility and rational expectations. In order for risk neutral investors to be in-
diﬀerent between domestic and foreign debt titles, the expected nominal returns
on both assets - adjusted for default risk and the corresponding risk premium
13The risk premium only compensates for the possible monitoring costs in case of default
and therefore does not add to the expected return on domestic debt titles. Monitoring costs
may arise due to asymmetry of information between lenders and borrowers. Section 2.2 deals
extensively with the risk premium. For now, we will leave it aside.
14T h el o go ft h ef o r e i g np r i c el e v e li sa s s u m e dt ob ez e r o .
15Recall that the risk premium, as deﬁned in our model, only relates to the relative default
risk of domestic debt titles versus foreign debt titles. We leave the possible positive absolute
risk premium in the foreign country aside. Section 2.2 gives a more extensive explanation of
the risk premium in our model.
16This ’spread’ could also be related to exchange rate risk. However, in our model we assume
the exchange rate risk to be symmetric. As a consequence, given the risk neutrality of market
participants, no risk premium is required for the exchange rate risk.
6- have to be equal. Therefore, the domestic nominal interest rate equals the
sum of the (ﬁxed) foreign nominal interest rate, the expected depreciation17 of
the domestic currency, and the required risk premium for the relatively higher
default risk on domestic debt. Equation (5) represents the assumption of pur-
chasing power parity in period t+1. Since the price level is ﬂexible in period
t+1, it will depend, amongs other things, on monetary policy in period t. How-
ever, both in the case of maintenance as in the case of abandonment of the peg
in period t, the nominal exchange rate will equal the price level in period t+1.
Equation (6) illustrates that the nominal interest rate in period t+1 equals the
sum of the real interest rate and the level of inﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt + 1.
2.1 Dynamics of the model
As explained above, our model considers two periods: period t and period t+1.
We assume that, prior to period t, the monetary authorities have been running
a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. The economy is assumed to be in long-run equi-
librium with output being equal to its natural level. At the beginning of period
t, market participants set prices according to their expectations of monetary
policy in that period.18 Since the peg has been viable up till period t and devia-
tions of the domestic and foreign debt levels are expected to be zero, the period
t price level will simply equal its level from the previous period. In other words,
market participants expect the ﬁxed exchange rate regime to be maintained
throughout period t, implying that the money supply will be kept unchanged.
After prices have been set, the monetary authorities observe the domestic and
foreign debt levels and, subsequently, choose monetary policy by minimising its
loss function. Our model will show that the maintenance or abandonment of
the ﬁxed exchange rate regime depends, amongst other things, on the possible
deviations of debt levels from their natural levels. Section 2.3 deals with the
preferences of the monetary authorities. Returning to equations (1) and (4),
maintenance or abandonment determines the causality in our model. In case of
maintenance, the causality runs from the right-hand side of the uncovered inter-
est parity condition (4) to the left-hand side of the money market equilibrium
condition (1). If it is no longer optimal to support the peg, monetary policy is
no longer restricted and the monetary authorities will set monetary policy so as
to minimise their loss function in the current period. In this case causality runs
from the left-hand side of the money market equilibrium (1) to the right-hand
side of the uncovered interest parity condition (4).
In period t+1, prices are fully ﬂexible and the economy reaches its long
run steady-state equilibrium. We assume that possible deviations of the debt
levels only last throughout period t. Furthermore, as stated before, we assume
that, given the domestic and foreign debt levels, market participants and the
monetary authorities have perfect foresight on the path of the economy. This
implies that they foresee, amongst other things, the time path of monetary
17Note that, as we assume perfect foresight and long-run equilibrium in period t+1,w ec a n
write St+1 for the expected t+1 exchange rate.
18For simplicity, we will not distinguish between consumers and producers.
7policy. Given the monetary policy stance in period t (either maintenance or
collapse), they are therefore able to set their t+1 prices so as to ensure steady
state equilibrium in the money and goods markets. In other words, monetary
policy is neutral in the long run.
2.2 Financial fragility and the risk premium
As stated in the introduction, our model illustrates how the trade-oﬀ between
costs of maintenance and abandonment depends on the degree of ﬁnancial
fragility in the economy. In our model, ﬁnancial fragility relates to the state
of the balance sheets in the corporate sector. More in particular, we deﬁne
ﬁnancial fragility as the degree to which the net worth of the corporate sector
is vulnerable to increases in the domestic interest rate and/or devaluations of
the currency. Higher ﬁnancial fragility therefore corresponds to higher levels of
(consolidated19) domestic short-term debt and/or higher levels of (consolidated)
foreign debt. The level of ﬁnancial fragility inﬂuences the monetary authorities
’trade-oﬀ ’ through the risk premium.
2.2.1 The risk premium
As explained before, we assume imperfect substitutability of domestic and for-
eign debt titles. As a consequence, the diﬀerence between the domestic and
foreign nominal interest rates not only has to cover for a future change in the
nominal exchange rate, but also has to compensate for the diﬀerence in risk
premiums on debt titles in both countries. The microeconomic underpinning of
the risk premium that we use in our model follows from Céspedes, Chang, and
Velasco (2000) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998). A crucial element
in the analysis is the assumption of asymmetric information between borrow-
ers and lenders of capital. Borrowers have complete insight into the returns
of investments whereas lenders cannot observe these returns unless they pay
a proportional monitoring cost. Referring to Williamson (1987), the authors
assume an ’optimal’ standard debt contract in which a ﬁxed repayment is laid
d o w n . A sl o n ga sb o r r o w e r sp a yo ﬀ their debt, lenders have no incentive to
monitor the realised return on investment. However, if borrowers renege on the
debt contract, lenders will monitor the outcome and claim the whole return
on investment. The question of whether borrowers can meet their obligations
depends on the realised return on investment, which Céspedes et. al. assume
to be independently and identically distributed. Given the level of debt and the
required return on this debt, one can determine a minimum threshold level of
the realised return for which the borrower is still able to pay oﬀ his debt. If the
realised return falls short of this minimum level, bankruptcy will follow shortly
thereafter and the lender will have to incur monitoring costs. These possible
costs of monitoring give rise to the existence of a risk premium on debt titles.
19We assume the supply side of the domestic economy to consist of a positive number of
identical ﬁrms. The equations hereafter not only apply to ﬁrms at the individual level but
also refer to the entire economy at the consolidated level.
8The level of these expected monitoring costs is shown to be depending on the
level of investment relative to the level of net worth of the borrower20.T h e
h i g h e rt h ep r o p o r t i o no fn e tw o r t hi nt o t a li n v e s t m e n t ,t h el o w e rt h ep a r to ft h e
investment that is externally ﬁnanced, and the lower the minimum threshold
value of the realised return for which the borrower can still repay his debt. After
all, in case of a disappointing outcome, the borrower can draw more heavily on
reserves to meet his obligations. Given the distribution of the realised returns, a
lower threshold value implies a lower probability of bankruptcy and correspond-
ingly, lower expected monitoring costs and a lower risk premium. Formally, we
assume that the risk premium is simply given by:





=l n Investmentt − lnNetWortht (7)
All variables in non-logarithmic forms.
Equation (2) showed that the level of (real) investment is negatively related
to the deviation of the real interest rate from its natural level. For simplicity,
we assume the level of investment in (7) to be given by:
ln Investmentt = ψ − δ (rt − rn) (8)
where ψ and δ are positive constants.
Endogeneity of net worth The risk premium, which is part of the real
interest rate, depends on the level of (real) net worth. However, net worth itself
also depends on the level of the interest rate. As real domestic debt is subject
to the short-term real interest rate - that is under control of the monetary
authorities - raising this interest rate will have a positive eﬀect on the real
amount of money that borrowing ﬁrms have to repay at the end of the period.
As a consequence, the real present value of debt increases and, for a given value
of total assets, the level of real net worth will fall. Next to the domestic interest
rate, net worth also depends on the level of the real exchange rate. As foreign
debt is denominated in foreign currency, the real domestic currency value of
foreign debt, and consequently, the level of real net worth, varies with the level
of the real exchange rate.
Formally, the relation between the interest rate and net worth can be deﬁned
as follows:
ln Net Wortht = ln (ˆ φt − ˆ rt ˆ dd
t − (
ˆ St
ˆ Sfix) ˆ d
f
t ) (9)
20The borrower can be viewed as an entrepreneur.
9ˆ φt consolidated total assets at the beginning of period t
(equal to the sum of debt and net worth)
ˆ dd
t consolidated domestic debt at the beginning of period t, maturing
in 1 period.




t consolidated foreign debt at the beginning of period t.
Absolute versus relative risk premia Integrating (8) and (9) into (7)
yields:
ln Risk Premiumt = ψ − δ (rt − rn) − ln (ˆ φt − ˆ rt ˆ dd
t − (
ˆ St
ˆ Sfix) ˆ d
f
t ) (10)
Equation (3) stated that the natural real interest rate equals the (ﬁxed)
foreign real interest rate (equal to c). This reﬂects the assumption that the
foreign economy is permanently in long-run equilibrium. This equilibrium is
identical to the period t-1 equilibrium in the home country. The price level
is ﬁxed and, additionally, we assume the (’natural’) domestic and foreign debt
levels to be equal to zero. In footnotes 11 and 15 we already distinguished
between absolute risk premia in the home and foreign country and the relative
risk premium, being the diﬀerence between the domestic and foreign risk premia.
The variable RPt,a sl a i dd o w ni ne q u a t i o n s( 1) and (4), refers to the relative
risk premium, which can be determined as follows.
T h ea b s o l u t ed o m e s t i cr i s kp r e m i u ms i m p l ye q u a l st h er i s kp r e m i u ma sg i v e n
by equation (10). The absolute foreign risk premium can be deﬁned by inte-
grating the assumptions above into (10):
ln absolute foreign risk premiumt = ψ − ln ˆ φt (11)
For simplicity, we assume that the absolute foreign risk premium equals
zero. As a consequence, the foreign real interest rate equals c.T h er e l a t i v er i s k
premium, RPt
21, can be found by subtracting (11)f r o m( 10):












Using the approximation ln(1 + x) ≈ x we can rewrite (12) as:












With the same approximation, ˆ rt can be written as (1 + rt) and (
ˆ St
ˆ Sfix) can
be rewritten as (1 + St − Sfix):
21Recall that RPt denotes the logarithm of (1+RPt), where RPt denotes the default risk
premium on domestic debt relative to foreign debt in period t.










2.3 The monetary authorities
2.3.1 Fixed exchange rate regime
We assume that, prior to period t, the monetary authorities have been maintain-
ing a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. We assume that this policy was implemented
to abandon the so-called ’inﬂationary bias’, caused by the policymakers’ incen-
tive to stimulate output above its natural level.22 The monetary authorities
guarantee the ﬁxed level of the exchange rate by standing ready to buy or sell
domestic currency in return for foreign currency at the ﬁxed rate. This implies
that any change in the nominal interest rate - needed to maintain the equality
in (4), given the ﬁxed exchange rate - is automatically facilitated by an ad-
justment of the money supply. If, for example, the foreign interest rate rises,
market participants will want to sell domestic debt titles, exchange the receipts
for foreign currency and buy foreign debt titles. Under a ﬂoating exchange rate,
this selling of domestic currency would cause it to depreciate. In case of a ﬁxed
exchange rate, the monetary authorities will accommodate this selling at the
ﬁxed rate. As a consequence, its stock of foreign reserves will fall and the do-
mestic money supply will fall. The resulting higher domestic interest rate will
restore the equilibrium in (4). In our model, the foreign interest rate is assumed
ﬁxed and the maintenance of a ﬁxed exchange rate is limited to simply keeping
the real money supply constant. However, the policy implications are not much
diﬀerent. Monetary policy is no longer a policy instrument as it cannot be used
to stimulate output.
However, the ﬁxed exchange rate regime is not irreversible. We assume that,
as in second-generation models of currency crises, the maintenance of a ﬁxed
exchange rate is a matter of trade-oﬀ. A sl o n ga st h ec o s t so fm a i n t e n a n c e
do not exceed the costs of abandonment of this regime, the authorities choose
to maintain the ﬁxed level. If this is no longer the case, they will abandon
the peg and allow the exchange rate to ﬂoat. The costs of maintenance and
abandonment are dependent on the monetary authorities’ preferences, discussed
in the next subsection.
2.3.2 Preferences
We assume the monetary authorities to care about both the level of inﬂation and
the level of output. Its preferences are given by the following loss function, which
is assumed to reﬂect society’s losses. Consequently, the monetary authorities
simply maximise social welfare.






t+1 +( yt − yn − k)2 (15)
All variables in logarithms, except for χ and η;
χ, η and k assumed to be strictly positive
χ relative weight put on price stabilisation (degree of conservativeness
of the monetary authorities)
η (1+n), where n denotes the monetary authorities’ rate of time
preference
k positive wedge between the output level targeted by the monetary
authorities and the natural output level
Equation (15) contains two types of costs. The ﬁrst part of the right-hand
side of equation (15) denotes the cost of a non-zero rate of inﬂation. Since our
two-period model assumes price stickiness in the short-run, inﬂation can only
be non-zero in period t+1. Given rational expectations and long-run equilib-
rium debt levels in period t+1, market participants anticipate the t+1 level of
inﬂation. Moosa (1997) mentions 4 types of costs that are associated with an-
ticipated inﬂation: ’(1) "shoe-leather" costs arising from trying to economise on
real money balances; (2) the "menu" costs arising from the recurrent revision
of price lists and labels; (3) the costs associated with the operation of a less-
than-perfectly-indexed tax system; and (4) the adverse eﬀect on the balance of
payments arising from the loss of competitiveness23.’ In addition to these spe-
ciﬁc cost types, a more general argument that is sometimes made is that higher
levels of inﬂation are associated with higher variability of inﬂation rates.24 As-
suming that variability of inﬂation is undesirable from a society’s point of view,
this could also make an argument for reducing the level of inﬂation.
The second part illustrates the cost of a deviation of output from the mon-
etary authorities’ optimal level, yn + k. As the monetary authorities can only
inﬂuence the level of output in the short-run, the costs of output deviations in
the long run, when output equals its natural level, are taken as given. Possi-
ble rationales for the positive wedge between the targeted output level and the
natural output level could be related to the political business cycle or an imper-
fectly functioning labour market. The latter could, according to Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (1996), even from a social welfare point of view25, cause an incentive to
stimulate output above its natural level. For example, the existence of distor-
tions like a minimum wage level and/or an income tax may cause the socially
optimal level of unemployment to be below the natural level. Alternatively,
wage negotiatiors may only be concerned with the welfare of the employed peo-
ple and may disregard the interests of the unemployed, leading to a wage level
that exceeds the socially optimal level.
23This last element is of less importance in the context of our model since we assume
purchasing power parity in period t+1.
24Refer to for example Eijﬃn g e ra n dD eH a a n( 1996), Friedman (1977) and Chowdhury
(1991).
25Recall that we assume the monetary authorities to maximise social welfare.
12The trade-oﬀ between costs of maintenance and costs of abandonment, ex-
plained in terms of output and inﬂation deviations, closely relates to the litera-
ture on rules and discretion in monetary policy.26 In particular, the ’temptation’
to stimulate output above its natural level versus the ’enforcement’ of higher
inﬂation in the future was ﬁrst introduced by Barro and Gordon (1983). In an
earlier paper, Kydland and Prescott (1977) argued in favor of formal monetary
policy rules to limit the inﬂationary bias resulting from discretionary policy. If,
for example, the policymakers announce a credible zero inﬂation rule and, conse-
quently, inﬂation expectations are brought down to zero, they will ex post have
an incentive27 to generate a positive rate of inﬂation. However, in a model with
rational expectations, market participants will anticipate this ’cheating behav-
ior’ of the policymakers and will adjust their expectations accordingly. Barro
and Gordon (1983) extend the analysis to a multiperiod model in which the loss
of reputation can substitute for formal rules. If the monetary authorities do not
stick to the rule in the current period, they will face a higher level of inﬂation
in the subsequent periods. The latter eﬀect is deﬁned as the ’enforcement’, as
it creates an incentive for the policymakers to obey the rule.
2.3.3 Post-collapse monetary policy
We assume that, in order to bring inﬂationary expectations down in one period,
the monetary authorities have to announce the peg one period earlier. More-
over, we assume that monetary policy can be adjusted only once per period.
Consequently, if the monetary authorities decide to abandon the peg in period
t, they cannot credibly install a new peg throughout the remainder of period
ta n dp e r i o dt + 1. The only alternative left is to run a fully ﬂexible exchange
rate regime.28 Monetary policy is now no longer restricted by an exchange rate
target and can be set freely. As a consequence, the monetary authorities will
set monetary policy so as to minimise their loss each period.
3S o l v i n g t h e m o d e l
In order to solve the model, it is useful to start by deriving the discretionary
long-run equilibrium. This is the equilibrium in the absence of a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime or any alternative monetary policy rule and with debt ratios at their
natural levels.
3.1 Discretionary equilibrium
As explained before, we assume policymakers and market participants to have
perfect foresight, given that domestic and foreign debt ratios are at their natural
26F o ra no v e r v i e w ,p l e a s er e f e rt oS i j b e n( 1996)
27Barro and Gordon (1983) refer to this incentive as ’temptation’.
28As stated before, we abstract from any less extreme forms of limitations of exchange rate
variability, like for example exchange rate bands.
13levels29. This implies that market participants will anticipate monetary policy
and the price level will be set so as to ensure that output does not deviate
from its natural level. However, since the targeted level exceeds the natural
output level, the monetary authorities face an incentive to stimulate output
above its natural level. Market participants foresee this and therefore adjust
their inﬂation expectations, which will be reﬂected in the period t price level.
The resulting positive level of inﬂation, that arises without any output gain,
is called the ’inﬂationary bias’. It results from the incentive to cheat and the
absence of any enforcement mechanism30.W e d e ﬁne this inﬂationary bias as
πn, which could be understood as ’the natural rate of inﬂation’ under rational
expectations.
Appendix A shows the derivation of the discretionary equilibrium. The
optimal level of the money supply is shown to be:
















´ · k (17)
The determinants of the inﬂationary bias are rather straightforward. It is
positively depending on λ and θ because these coeﬃcients imply the eﬀective-
ness of activist monetary policy through the ’interest rate’ and ’exchange rate’
channels, respectively. Higher levels of eﬀectiveness correspond to a more ac-
tivist monetary policy. Further, the inﬂationary bias is negatively depending
on β, which indicates the inverse of the impact of money supply changes on
the level of the interest rate.31 Higher levels of β correspond to a lower impact
of monetary easening on the interest rate and reduce the monetary authorities’
incentive to cheat. The inﬂationary bias also decreases with the monetary au-
thorities’ degree of conservativeness,
χ
η,a si n ﬂation gets more costly. Finally,
the positive wedge between the output level targeted by the monetary author-
ities’ and the natural output level, k,c a u s i n gt h ei n ﬂationary bias in the ﬁrst
place, has a positive eﬀect on its size.
3.2 Equilibria under an initially ﬁxed exchange rate
Now that we have determined the ’natural level of inﬂation’, we proceed by de-
riving the equilibria under maintenance and abandonment of the ﬁxed exchange
29Since we are solving the discretionary long-run equilibrium, by assumption the debt ratios
do not deviate from their natural levels.
30like the earlier mentioned formal rules (Kydland and Prescott (1977)) or loss of reputation
(Barro and Gordon (1983)).
31Recall equation (1)
14rate regime. Therefore, we assume a ﬁxed exchange rate regime to be in place,
prior to period t. Note that we still assume the economy to be in long-run
equilibrium in period t-1 and t+1. However, in period t, the economy may
temporarily depart from long-run equilibrium, as the domestic and foreign debt
ratios may deviate from their natural levels. We will determine the conditions
under which it becomes too costly for the monetary authorities to maintain the
currency peg, and, in particular, how the sizes of the debt ratios relate to this
possible abandonment.
3.2.1 Maintenance of the ﬁxed exchange rate
Appendix B(1) shows the derivation of the equilibrium in case of maintenance
of the ﬁxed exchange rate throughout period t. The costs of maintenance are

































If debt levels equal their natural levels, the costs of maintenance simply equal
k2.E q u a t i o n( 18) shows how deviations of the domestic and foreign debt levels
increase the costs of maintaining a ﬁxed exchange rate. Intuitively, the higher
debt levels correspond to higher risk premiums on domestic debt titles. For any
given level of the money supply, the domestic real interest rate increases and
as a consequence, output will fall below its natural level, increasing the output
costs of maintenance.
3.2.2 Abandonment of the ﬁxed exchange rate
Appendix B(2) shows the derivation of the equilibrium in case of abandonment

































































3.2.3 Maintenance or Collapse?
Equation (18) and (19) showed the costs of maintenance and abandonment of
a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, respectively. As long as the costs of maintenance
do not exceed the costs of abandonment, the ﬁxed exchange rate regime will
15survive. However, as soon as the costs of maintenance do exceed the costs of
abandonment, the monetary authorities will choose to abandon the peg and







































 − πn > 0 (20)
The function Ω contains several variables that, together, determine whether
the ﬁxed exchange rate will survive. The separate eﬀect of every variable on the
probability of crisis can be determined by using ﬁrst-order derivatives.32 Section
4 will discuss the alternative determinants of currency crises. Note that a posi-
tive ﬁrst-order derivative does not necessarily correspond to a higher probability
of collapse, as it may be the case that the maximum value of the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h e































will under no circumstances exceed the natural level of inﬂation, πn.H o w e v e r ,
this would imply that the costs of future inﬂation always exceed the costs of
lower output in the short run, regardless of the state of the economy. Given
the severeness of economic downturn that is often observed in crisis countries,
we do not ﬁnd this implication intuitively appealing. We will therefore assume
that output costs can, under speciﬁc circumstances, exceed the costs of future
inﬂation.
4 Determinants of currency crises
We will now use the result in (20) to determine the eﬀects of several model
variables on the probability of a currency collapse. First and foremost, we want
to show the inﬂuence of domestic and foreign currency denominated debt levels
on the probability of collapse.
4.1 Domestic debt levels




, has on the probability of collapse






´ > 0 (21)
32Note that we only consider the eﬀect of a change in one variable on the function Ω.T o
determine the minimum absolute levels of individual variables at which a regime collapse takes
place, one would have to use calibration in order to get meaningful numbers. We will leave
this aside.
16The positive sign of the ﬁrst-order derivative implies that a higher level of
domestic currency denominated debt will, ceteris paribus, increase the proba-
bility of a currency crisis. From Appendix B and equation (20) it can be shown
that the positive eﬀect of a higher domestic debt level on the probability of
collapse consists of two components.
On the one hand, higher domestic debt levels raise the costs of maintenance
due to the increase in the risk premium that borrowers have to pay. The level
of investment will fall and consequently, output will fall further below the tar-
geted level. This output cost can be compensated for by abandoning the ﬁxed
exchange rate and lowering the real interest rate. In equation (20), this com-























. We will refer to this component as the ’need
for stabilisation’. Higher output costs of maintenance make it more urgent
for the monetary authorities to compensate for this output loss.
On the other hand, higher domestic debt levels also inﬂuence the impact of a
lower interest rate. Equation (86) in Appendix B(2) shows that the eﬀectiveness
of output loss compensation by monetary easening is positively depending on
A. Since a higher level of domestic debt corresponds to a higher level of A,t h e
eﬀectiveness of abandoning the ﬁxed exchange rate increases for higher domestic
debt levels. In equation (20), the eﬀectiveness of abandonment is reﬂected









Appendix B(4) shows that this part depends positively on A,r e ﬂecting the
eﬀectiveness argument above. Intuitively, a higher level of domestic debt makes
an interest rate cut more eﬀective, as it adds a larger decline of the risk premium
to the initial cut. Consequently, the positive eﬀect on output will be stronger.
We will refer to this component as the ’eﬀectiveness of abandonment’.
Summarising, a higher level of domestic currency denominated debt will
increase the probability of a currency crisis for two reasons. First, it increases
the costs of maintenance, which creates a stronger incentive to compensate
for the output loss. And second, it makes monetary easening more eﬀective,
creating a second incentive to abandon the currency peg.33
4.2 Foreign debt levels
Whereas the eﬀect of higher domestic debt levels on the probability of currency
crises is rather straightforward, the eﬀect of higher foreign currency denominated
debt levels is more complex. Appendix B(4) shows the ﬁrst-order derivative:
33Although a higher level of domestic currency denominated debt makes monetary easening
more eﬀective, the eﬀect on the level of the money supply cannot be determined without























































































It can be shown that all righthand side terms in equation (22) have pos-












. As a result, the sign
of the eﬀect of foreign debt on the probability of crisis equals the sum of a
positive and negative term and is therefore, without further speciﬁcation, inde-
terminable. However, again, a distinction can be made between the ’need for
stabilisation’ and the ’eﬀectiveness of abandonment’. As in the case of higher
domestic debt, the costs of maintenance increase, resulting in a stronger in-























 in equation (20). The eﬀectiveness of monetary
easening, however, decreases for higher levels of foreign debt, creating a re-







and the negative relation between foreign debt and A.I n t u -
itively, this reverse eﬀect is explained as follows. Higher levels of foreign debt
will, in case of monetary policy easening, partially cancel the interest rate de-
cline. This is because the risk premium will, for higher foreign debt levels and
ceteris paribus, increase in case of an abandonment of the ﬁxed exchange rate.
The higher risk premium occurs because the higher level of foreign debt will
cause ﬁrms’ net worth to drop, ceteris paribus, in case of a devaluation.
Summarising, the net eﬀect of higher foreign currency denominated debt on
the probability of a currency crisis equals the sum of two reverse components.
On the one hand, it increases the costs of maintenance and consequently, the
’need for stabilisation’. On the other hand, it makes monetary easening less
eﬀective, creating an incentive to maintain the currency peg. Which component
will dominate, depends on the values of the variables in our model.
184.3 Other variables
Appendix B(4) shows the eﬀect of changes in the other model variables on the
probability of crisis. The net eﬀects of a higher level of conservativeness, time
preference, and targeted output, are shown to contain two opposite eﬀects. The
impact of the real exchange rate and real interest rate elasticities of output,
and the interest rate channel of monetary policy are also shown to be twofold.
Consequently, the sign of the net eﬀects of these variables cannot be determined
without calibration. The eﬀect of the natural domestic real interest rate on the
probability of abandonment is positive as it lowers the ﬁrms’ net worth and,
consequently, raises the risk premium and the costs of maintenance. Finally,
the impact of the interest rate elasticity of investment is shown to be negative
because it lowers the net eﬀect of an interest rate change on the level of the
risk premium, and reduces the ’need for stabilisation’ and the ’eﬀectiveness of
abandonment’. Please refer to Appendix B(4) for a more detailed explanation.
Refering to the eﬀect of the monetary authorities’ conservativeness, it may
seem striking that the sign of this eﬀect remains undeterminable. Note however,
that we assume the institutional design of the monetary authorities to remain
unchanged in case of abandonment of the ﬁxed exchange rate regime. More
conservative authorities will therefore lead to a lower post-collapse inﬂationary
bias. One could argue that the design of the monetary authorities, and in
particular the level of conservativeness, may change in case of abandonment of
the ﬁxed exchange rate. If the higher level of conservativeness, as mentioned
before, only applies to the case of a ﬁxed exchange rate, it will decrease the
probability of collapse since the post-collapse inﬂationary bias does not change.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have presented a two-period sticky-price monetary model to
study a small open emerging-market economy. The monetary authorities have
control over the level of the short-term exchange rate. Initially, they are assumed
to run a ﬁxed exchange rate regime to eliminate the inﬂationary bias that arises
in the absence of any monetary policy rule. When deciding on whether to main-
tain this regime, they face a trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation. The model
shows how the levels of domestic currency denominated and foreign currency
denominated short-term debt inﬂuence this trade-oﬀ. Through their impact on
the risk premium that borrowers have to pay on their loans, the debt levels
alter the level of the domestic real interest rate. Since output is in the short
run assumed to depend on this interest rate, the levels of domestic and foreign
debt aﬀect short-run output and, consequently, the costs of maintenance and
costs of abandonment of the ﬁxed exchange rate. By deriving the discretionary
equilibrium and the equilibria under maintenance and abandonment of the ﬁxed
exchange rate regime, the costs of maintenance and abandonment could be com-
pared. More speciﬁcally, it enabled us to identify the condition under which the
monetary authorities abandon the ﬁxed exchange rate regime; an event that we,
19like in second-generation literature, refer to as a ’currency crisis’.
Given the condition for abandonment, the impact of several variables on the
probability of crisis was measured by taking ﬁrst-order derivatives. Although
the actual occurrence of a crisis depends on the levels of a combination of vari-
ables, these derivatives indicate whether an increase in one variable brings the
economy closer to or further away from crisis. When interpreting the impact of
the variables, a distinction can be made between two components of the relative
gains of abandonment. The ﬁrst, which we referred to as the ’need for stabili-
sation’, corresponds to the costs of maintenance. A higher level of these costs
will, ceteris paribus, make the alternative of abandoning the ﬁxed exchange rate
relatively more attractive. The second component, referred to as ’the eﬀective-
ness of abandonment’, corresponds to the degree to which abandoning the ﬁxed
exchange rate reduces the monetary authorities’ loss. This component amounts
to the impact of monetary easening on the level of output.
First and foremost, the impact of domestic and foreign currency denominated
debt levels on the probability of crisis was discussed. It was shown that a higher
level of domestic debt, ceteris paribus, increases the probability of collapse.
On the one hand, higher domestic debt raises the costs of maintenance and,
consequently, the ’need for stabilisation’, due to the higher risk premium that
borrowers have to pay. The level of investment will fall and, as a result, output
will fall further below the targeted level. On the other hand, higher domestic
debt levels also enlarge the impact of an interest rate cut and, thereby, the
’eﬀectiveness of abandonment’, as it adds a larger decline of the risk premium
to the initial cut. Consequently, the positive eﬀect on output will be stronger.
Whereas the eﬀect of higher domestic debt levels on the probability of cur-
rency crises is rather straightforward, the eﬀect of higher foreign debt is more
complex. It was shown that the sign of this eﬀect equals the sum of a positive
and negative term. Again, a distinction can be made between the ’need for
stabilisation’ and the ’eﬀectiveness of abandonment’. As in the case of domestic
debt, the costs of maintenance increase due to a higher risk premium, resulting
in a stronger incentive to stabilise output. The eﬀectiveness of monetary eas-
ening, however, decreases because for higher foreign debt levels, a devaluation
will cause a larger increase of the risk premium. This eﬀect partially cancels the
interest rate decline and, therefore, makes abandonment of the ﬁxed exchange
rate less eﬀective.
In addition, the eﬀects of several other variables on the probability of cri-
sis were discussed. The net eﬀects of a higher level of conservativeness, time
preference, and targeted output, were shown to contain two opposite eﬀects.
Furthermore, it was pointed out that the impact of the real exchange rate and
real interest rate elasticities of output, and the interest rate channel of monetary
policy are also twofold. Finally, the eﬀect of the natural domestic real interest
rate was shown to be positive whereas the impact of the interest rate elasticity
of investment was proven to be negative.
In this paper we have presented a model that combines the second-generation
trade-oﬀ between costs of maintenance and abandonment with possible balance-
sheet problems in the corporate sector. More in particular, we have shown how
20debt levels can move a small economy from a ﬁxed exchange rate to a ﬂoating
exchange rate equilibrium or vice versa, simply by altering the trade-oﬀ faced
by the monetary authorities. Even if the monetary authorities still have a
substantial amount of foreign reserves available to guarantee the ﬁxed value
of the currency, they might choose not to and abandon the ﬁxed exchange rate
regime.34 As was mentioned in the introduction, it is often argued that ﬁrst- and
second-generation literature have not been able to explain the crisis in East Asia
(’97-’98). The model presented in this paper, although not solely focusing on the
Asian crisis, suggests otherwise. Adding the corporate balance sheet positions
to second-generation models could substantially improve the explanatory power
of these models in the Asian crisis case. In this respect35, the high debt/equity
ratios in the corporate sector of several Asian crisis countries at the time of crisis
are remarkable. Especially when compared to the pre-crisis period in Mexico
in 1994, when this country was facing interest rates as high as 75 % (annually)
without collapsing, the Asian economies were more vulnerable because their
corporations were much more highly leveraged. In South Korea for example,
the debt/equity ratio in the corporate sector had been rising to 6.4 in 199636 -
a number that seems hardly possible in western economies.
The analysis in this paper suggests that, in order to limit a country’s vulner-
ability to crises, banks and ﬁrms should be less prone to changes in the interest
rate and exchange rate. The former might for example be accomplished by
further developing emerging equity markets.37
34Between March 1997 and June 1997 the level of international reserves in Thailand dropped
b y5 . 7b i l l i o nU Sd o l l a r s . H o w e v e r ,a tt h ee n do fJ u n ei ts t i l la m o u n t e dt o3 1.4 billions US
dollars (Berg, 1999, Table 3. p.15). So when, on July 2 1997, the Bank of Thailand announced
free-ﬂoat of the previously basket-pegged baht, its stock of foreign reserves was nowhere near
depletion.
35As already mentioned in the introduction.
36Berg (1999): Table 2, p.8.
37As discussed in IMF (2002).
21Appendix A Discretionary long-run equilibrium
To derive the period t equilibrium, we have to consider period t-138,p e r i o dt
a n dp e r i o dt + 1.
Period t-1
Recalling equation (4), the domestic t-1 interest rate is given by:
it−1 = i∗ + St − St−1 + RPt−1 (23)
The foreign nominal interest rate equals c.39 Given purchasing power parity
in all periods and perfect foresight, St− St−1 equals πn. Furthermore, since
the domestic economy is in long-run equilibrium, the absolute domestic risk
premium equals the absolute foreign risk premium (=0). Recalling (14), this
implies that the domestic real interest rate and the debt ratios40 equal their
long-run equilibrium levels. As a consequence, RPt−1 =0 . Equation (23) can
be rewritten as:
it−1 = c + πn (24)
This yields the following money market equilibrium (equation (1)):
Mt−1 − pt−1 = γ − β (c + πn) (25)
Period t
The price level in period t simply equals the sum of the t-1 price level and
the natural inﬂation rate (since monetary policy in period t-1 supported the
long-run equilibrium):
pt = pt−1 + πn (26)
Money market equilibrium in period t is similar to equation (1)41,w i t h
RPt =0 .
Mt = pt + γ − β · it (27)
Substituting (25) and (26) into (27) yields:
38Period t-1 is only considered here because in this period the expectations for period t are
formed.
39equal to the sum of the foreign real interest rate (equation (3)) and the foreign level of
inﬂation (assumed to be zero)
40Recall that the long-run equilibrium debt ratios are assumed to be zero.
41In equation (1) the price level was denoted as ﬁxed. We assume, throughout this paper,
that the price level cannot be adjusted throughout period t. However, the price level in
equation (1)w a sa s s u m e dt ob eﬁx e da sl o n ga st h eﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ew a sm a i n t a i n e d .
Here, monetary policy is discretionary and the price level changes every period.
22Mt = Mt−1 + πn − β(it − c − πn) (28)
(28) shows how the existence of rational expectations inﬂuences the money
market equilibrium. First of all, the nominal money supply in period t has to
exceed the level in the previous period in order to keep up with the expected
’natural rate of inﬂation’ (πn). In addition, deviations of the money supply
from its long-run equilibrium supporting value correspond to deviations of it
from c + πn (the latter being the equilibrium value for it).
Period t+1
We assume that in period t+1 the economy is in long-run equilibrium:
Mt+1 − pt+1 = γ − β (c + πn) (29)
Since the period t+1 price level is set to ensure that output will be at its
natural level, it equals the sum of the price level that supports the equilibrium,
given the period t money supply, and the natural rate of inﬂation.42
pt+1 = πn + Mt − γ + β (c + πn) (30)
Equilibrium
Rewriting equation (27) yields the following expression for the period t price
level.
pt = Mt − γ + β · it (31)
For the level of inﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt + 1 this implies:
pt+1 − pt = πn + β(c + πn − it) (32)
Rewriting equation (28) yields:
it = −
(Mt − Mt−1 − πn)
β
+ c + πn (33)
Substituting (33) into (32) and rearranging:
pt+1 − pt = Mt − Mt−1 (34)
Equation (34) deﬁnes the ﬁrst part of the monetary authorities’ loss function
in terms of the money supply, Mt. Turning to the second part of the monetary
authorities’ loss function, the eﬀect of monetary policy on output in period t
runs through the real interest rate, rt, and through the nominal exchange rate,
St.
42or in other words, the price level equals the equilibrium level in case the money supply
stays unchanged, plus the anticipated money supply change.
23yt = yn − λ (rt − rn)+θ (St − pt) (35)
We will ﬁrst consider the ’interest rate channel’. Recall (33):
it = −
(Mt − Mt−1 − πn)
β
+ c + πn (36)
Recall that, since we assume perfect foresight:
it = rt + ˙ pt+1 = rt + Mt − Mt−1 (37)




(Mt − Mt−1 − πn)+c (38)
Turning to the exchange rate eﬀect of monetary policy on output in period
t, St −pt, recall equation (4):
it = i∗ +( St+1 − St)+RPt (39)
With RPt =0and i∗ = c, (39) can be rewritten as:
St = St+1 − (it − c) (40)
Recall that we assumed long-run equilibrium in period t+1, where purchas-
ing power parity holds. Consequently, St+1 equals pt+1. Subtracting pt yields:
St − pt = pt+1 − pt − (it − c) (41)
Combining (33) and (34) yields:
St − pt = Mt − Mt−1 −
µ
−







(Mt − Mt−1 − πn) (42)
We can now write the monetary authorities’ loss function in terms of the
nominal money supply and solve for the optimal level of the money supply.






t+1 +( − λ (rt − rn)+θ (St − pt) − k)2 (43)














(Mt − Mt−1 − πn) − k
¶2
(44)
24Minimisation of the monetary authorities’ loss function yields the optimal
















































The resulting optimal level of the nominal money supply is:
Mt = Mt−1 +
X2
χ
η + X2 · πn +
X
χ
η + X2 · k (47)





The inﬂationary bias, πn, can now be made explicit. We assumed perfect
foresight, given that the debt levels are at their natural levels. This implies:
πn = ˙ pe
t+1 = ˙ pt+1 = Mt − Mt−1 (48)
where ˙ pe
t+1 is the expected level of inﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt + 1 (= pe
t+1 − pt).
Substituting (48) into (47) and solving for Mt yields:










´ · k (50)
25Appendix B Equilibria under an initially ﬁxed ex-
change rate
B1 Maintenance of the ﬁxed exchange rate
Again, we consider the equilibria in period t-1,t ,a n dt + 1, but now under the
condition that the monetary authorities decide to maintain the ﬁxed exchange
rate regime throughout period t.
Period t-1
Assuming long-run equilibrium, the risk premium is assumed to be zero (RPt−1 =
0). Furthermore, since the monetary authorities maintain the peg, the exchange
rate will remain constant. Consequently, equation (4) can be reduced to:
it−1 = c (51)
For the money market equilibrium43 this implies the following:
Mt−1 − ¯ pt−1 = γ − β · c (52)
Period t
Assuming a ﬁxed exchange rate and allowing for deviations of debt levels, equa-
tion (4) can be reduced to:
it = c + RPt (53)
Money market equilibrium now implies:
Mt =¯ pt + γ − β · c (54)
and, since the price level has not changed:
Mt = Mt−1 (55)
Period t+1
Under the assumptions that the ﬁxed exchange rate is maintained throughout
period t and the debt levels return to their natural levels, the equilibrium in
period t is similar to the period t-1 equilibrium:
it+1 = c (56)
Since the price level has not changed, money market equilibrium is identical
to period t-1:
43Recall equation (1)
26Mt+1 − ¯ pt+1 = γ − β · c (57)
Equilibrium
Since we have assumed that the monetary authorities maintain the currency
peg44, we can calculate the costs of maintenance, according to the monetary






t+1 +( − λ (rt − rn)+θ (St − pt) − k)2 (58)
As shown above, the price level remains ﬁxed. Consequently, period t+1
inﬂation equals zero. Moreover, the level of the exchange rate also remains
ﬁxed. Given the assumption of purchasing power parity in period t-1,t h i s
implies that the period t price level equals the period t level of the exchange
rate. Equation (58) can therefore be reduced to:
LCB
t =( − λ (rt − rn) − k)2 (59)
Since inﬂation is zero, the domestic real interest rate equals the domestic
nominal interest rate.
rt = it = c + RPt (60)
Substituting (14) into (60) yields:










For St − Sfix =0 , rearranging yields:
rt =














































44Ex post, we will deﬁne the conditions under which the monetary authorities will choose
to maintain the ﬁxed exchange rate. These conditions depend on the trade-oﬀ between the
costs of maintenance and abandonment.
27B2 Abandonment of the ﬁxed exchange rate
Period t-1
Assuming a ﬁxed exchange rate prior to period t, the period t-1 equilibrium in
the ’abandonment’ scenario is similar to the t-1 equilibrium in case of mainte-
nance:
it−1 = c (64)
Mt−1 − ¯ pt−1 = γ − β · c (65)
Period t
We assume the monetary authorities to abandon the peg in period t. As a result,
they regain their monetary policy autonomy and will set the money supply so
as to minimise its loss function. Given the possible deviation of debt levels in
period t, money market equilibrium denotes the following:
Mt − ¯ pt = γ − β(it − RPt) (66)
Given that ¯ pt =¯ pt−1,( 6 6 )c a nb er e w r i t t e na s :
(it − RPt)=−






Recall equation (4) for the revised uncovered interest parity condition:
it = i∗ +( St+1 − St)+RPt (68)
Period t+1
We assume that, given the abandonment of the ﬁxed exchange rate in period t,
the economy will adjust to its new long-run equilibrium in period t+1.T h e r e -
fore, the t+1 price level equals the equilibrium level in case the money supply
stays at its period t level, plus the anticipated money supply change45.
pt+1 = πn + Mt − γ + β (c + πn) (69)
Further, the money market equilibrium and uncovered interest parity equa-
tions are given by:
Mt+1 − pt+1 = γ − β(c + πn) (70)
it+1 = c + πn (71)
45Recall that this anticipated change simply equals the level of the inﬂationary bias, as
derived in Appendix A.
28Equilibrium
Given the equilibria above, we calculate the costs of abandonment, according






t+1 +( − λ (rt − rn)+θ (St − pt) − k)2 (72)
Starting with the level of inﬂation, combining (66) and (69) yields:
pt+1 − ¯ pt = πn + Mt − γ + β (c + πn) − Mt + γ − β(it − RPt)
= πn − β(it − RPt − (c + πn)) (73)
Substituting (67) into (73) yields:
pt+1 − ¯ pt =( 1+β) πn + Mt − Mt−1 (74)
Turning to the second part of the monetary authorities’ loss function, the
eﬀect of monetary policy on output in period t runs through the real interest
rate, rt, and through the nominal exchange rate, St.
yt = yn − λ (rt − rn)+θ (St − ¯ pt) (75)




+ c + RPt (76)
Equation (14) deﬁned the risk premium:










The term St −Sfix is not exogenous as it is depending on the interest rate.
Rewriting equation (4) yields:
St = −(it − RPt − i∗)+St+1 (78)





Recall that Sfix =¯ pt; substituting (74) for the level of inﬂation yields:
St − Sfix =
(Mt − Mt−1)
β
+ pt+1 − ¯ pt =
(1 + β)
β
(Mt − Mt−1 + β · πn) (80)
Substituting (80) into (77) yields the following:


































Recall that, once period t monetary policy is known, the t+1 level of inﬂation
and, consequently, the period t real interest rate is also known.
it = rt + ˙ pt+1 = rt +( 1+β)πn +( Mt − Mt−1) (83)
Combining (82) and (83) and rearranging:
rt =

























´ (Mt − Mt−1 + β · πn) (84)
Turning to the exchange rate eﬀect of monetary policy on output in period
t, St −pt (= St − Sfix),r e c a l le q u a t i o n( 8 0 ) :
St − pt =
(1 + β)
β
(Mt − Mt−1 + β · πn) (85)
Using (74), (84), and (85), we can now write the monetary authorities’ loss




























































30Minimisation of the monetary authorities’ loss function yields the optimal





































































































































































































































































































































































































B3 Maintenance or Collapse?
The monetary authorities will abandon the ﬁxed exchange rate regime if the
costs of maintenance exceed the costs of abandonment. Recalling equation (18)
























































































































































































































































































































 − πn (99)
B4 Crisis determinants
Domestic debt level









































































































































33Since the inﬂationary bias is not depending on the debt levels, the last part of























































































































































































Given the speciﬁed ranges of possible values for the variables and coeﬃcients,






´ > 0 (105)
Foreign debt level



















































































































































Since the inﬂationary bias is not depending on the debt levels, the last part of





























































































































































´ ≷ 0 (110)
35Other variables
Conservativeness and time preference We determine the impact of the
monetary authorities’ degree of conservativeness, χ, and rate of time preference,



























































(111) shows that the eﬀect of conservativeness on the probability of crisis
is the sum of two reverse components. On the one hand, more conservative
authorities lower the inﬂationary bias, which diminishes the enforcement of a
ﬁxed exchange rate and increases the probability of crisis. On the other hand, it
increases the costs of abandoning the peg because inﬂation is more costly. The
latter reduces the probability of abandonment.
A higher rate of time preference increases the inﬂationary bias and lowers
the costs of abandonment because the present value of the future inﬂation costs
decrease.
Wedge between targeted output and natural output The impact of a
higher level of targeted output (relative to natural output) on the probability

























The impact on the probability of crisis is also twofold. It increases the
inﬂationary bias but, at the same time, increases the costs of maintenance and,
therefore, the ’need for stabilisation’, as deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n4 . 1.
The natural domestic real interest rate The eﬀect of the natural domestic


























 > 0 (113)
In our model, a higher level of the natural domestic real interest rate will
lower ﬁrms’ net worth for every level of debt. This implies a higher risk pre-
mium and, consequently, higher costs of maintenance and a higher ’need for
stabilisation’.
36The interest rate elasticity of investment The eﬀect of δ on the proba-






































































































The ﬁrst-order derivative is strictly negative. The intuitive explanation fol-
lows from equation (14). Note that a higher δ implies that the net worth decline
in case of an interest rate increase will to a larger degree be compensated by
lower investments. As a result, the net eﬀect of an interest rate change on the
risk premium will be smaller. For the trade-oﬀ between costs of maintenance
and abandonment this means that both the ’need for stabilisation’ and the ’ef-
fectiveness of abandonment’ will decrease. The need for a lower interest rate is
smaller because the risk premium is lower for higher values of δ.T h ee ﬀective-
ness of abandoning the ﬁxed exchange rate is lower because monetary easening
will have a smaller net eﬀect on the risk premium.
The real exchange rate elasticity of output The impact of θ on the




























































As was the case with several variables discussed above, the impact of the real
exchange rate elasticity of output is twofold. The ’eﬀectiveness of abandonment’
37increases because a devaluation will have a larger positive impact on output.
However, the inﬂationary bias also increases because the monetary authorities
face a larger incentive to ease their monetary policy stance.
The domestic real interest rate elasticity of output Recall that the
domestic real interest rate elasticity of output, λ, is strongly related to the
earlier discussed interest rate elasticity of investment, δ, although this relation
is not made explicit in our paper.46 The ﬁrst-order derivative of Ω can be shown













































































































The impact of λ is comparable to the impact of θ. It also increases the ’ef-
fectiveness of abandonment’ and the inﬂationary bias. Additionally, however, it
also increases the costs of maintenance and, consequently, the ’need for stabili-
sation’. The sign of the net eﬀect is, again, indeterminable without calibration.
The ’interest rate channel of monetary policy’ coeﬃcient The impact
of monetary policy on the interest rate is given by the coeﬃcient β.H i g h e r
levels of β correspond to a smaller impact of monetary policy on the interest
rate. The ﬁrst-derivative of Ω is given by:

















































































A higher level of β decreases the ’eﬀectiveness of abandonment’ because
monetary easening has a weaker eﬀect on the interest rate. On the other hand,
it lowers the inﬂationary bias for the same reason. The net eﬀect is, as before,
undeterminable.
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